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In spite of rapid urbanization in most parts of the world over the past two decades, rural 
development remains a major challenge for developing countries in Africa, Asia and 
Latin America. According to a recent World Bank report, “75 percent of the world’s poor 
live in rural areas and most are involved in farming.”2 There is also new urgency for 
addressing rural problems generated by population pressure on land, water and other 
resources, threats to the environment, climate change, and widening income disparity 
between rural and urban areas. National governments and international development 
assistance agencies are once again placing increased emphasis on rural and agricultural 
development as critical for reducing poverty and achieving the United Nations 
Millennium Development Goals. If today’s programs are to achieve their objectives they 
must learn lessons from the many rural development initiatives pursued over the past 
decades. 
 
One of these past programs was the Saemaul Undong, or New Community Movement, 
initiated by President Park Chung Hee in South Korea in the early 1970s. The purpose of 
this paper is to examine this program for lessons that might inform today’s rural 
development programs in developing countries. One reason for a close look at the 
Saemaul Undong (SMU) is the success achieved by Korea in a relatively short time (the 
decade of the 1970s) in raising incomes and improving living standards in rural areas, 
thus narrowing the urban-rural divide. There are many examples of failure in the world of 
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2 World Bank, “Implementing Agriculture for Development:  World Bank Group Agricultural Action Plan, 
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rural development, so success certainly attracts attention and deserves to be celebrated 
and studied.3 
 
 
Korea’s Rural Transformation 
 
There can be little doubt that living standards in rural Korea improved markedly in the 
decade of the 1970s. According to reliable data, farm household income increased from 
an average of 255,800 won in 1970 to 1,531,300 in 1979.4 Other indicators are the 
increase in consumption of modern conveniences, such as television sets and refrigerators, 
supported by electrification of the countryside. Underlying these improvements was 
increased productivity of rice farming, the major livelihood of most rural families. 
Average rice yields increased from 3.1 metric tons per hectare in the period 1965–71 to 
4.0 tons in the period 1972–78, and the price received by farmers for their rice increased 
as well.5 As a result of these changes, absolute rural poverty declined from 27.9 percent 
in 1970 to 10.8 percent in 1978.6 
 
This transformation of rural Korea coincided with the launching and implementation of a 
government initiated, nationwide, community-based, integrated rural development 
program, the Saemaul Undong. The “high tide” of the rural SMU was the period from its 
launch in 1971 until the assassination of President Park in 1979, and that period will be 
the primary reference for this study. What was the role of the SMU in Korea’s rural 
transformation in the 1970s? What role was played by contextual factors peculiar to 
Korea and by other policy initiatives? By examining these questions I hope to identify 
some lessons that may be considered in designing programs in countries that would like 
to achieve similar results in their own rural communities. 
 
 
Korea’s National Development Path 
Korea’s successful economic development path followed a certain sequence that, in 
hindsight, may appear to have been planned, but more likely was in response to crises 
and opportunities. Comprehensive land reform (1948–51) was an early policy that was 
critical to development in the rural sector. Though land was redistributed more for 
political expediency (i.e., to respond to the threat of peasant unrest) than as a step in a 
                                                 
3 Having lived in South Korea during the 1970s, first as a Peace Corps Volunteer (1970–73) and later as 
Fulbright Scholar researching rural development (1976–77), I had the opportunity to observe Korea’s rural 
and urban areas at the height of the Saemaul Undong campaign. 
4 Park Soo-young, “Saemaul Undong for the 21st Century,” Journal of International Development 
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planned development process, the impact on all that followed was profound. During the 
decade of the 1950s import substitution industrialization was the general policy with only 
marginal success and the countryside was more or less neglected. However, during this 
period the government invested heavily in human and institutional capacity building and 
this focus accelerated in the 1960s. After taking power in a coup d’etat in 1961, President 
Park sought legitimacy and national strength through a policy of rapid growth in the 
industrial sector, but the rural areas continued to receive little attention except as a source 
of cheap labor for the new urban-based industries.  
By 1970, when SMU was initiated, Korea’s export-oriented industrial growth was on a 
clear upward path with rapid creation of jobs concentrated in the capital area and the 
southeast Yeongnam region. Between 1964 and 1970, Korea’s economy as a whole grew 
at an overall annual rate of 10 percent, but growth in the non-agricultural sector was 14.5 
percent, while growth in the agricultural sector was only 2.8 percent.7 There was a steady 
exodus from the rural villages by young women and men to work in the new factories 
(frequently under extremely poor conditions).8 The result was the beginning of an 
absolute decline in the rural labor force by the late 1960s. In the 1970s Korea’s economy 
continued to expand at annual rates of over 10 percent, accelerating job creation in the 
industrial and service sectors and also generating public financial resources available for 
reinvestment.9 
Based on this somewhat simplified sketch of the early period of Korea’s economic 
development we can see that the de facto policy sequence was something like this:   
Redistribution of wealth through land reform Æ Investment in human capital 
Æ Major investment and job creation in the industrial sector Æ Renewed 
attention to the agricultural and rural sector through SMU and other programs. 
 
What this means is that by the time SMU was introduced the Korean economy had 
already entered a period of sustained and rapid expansion. The aim of SMU and related 
programs was to help the rural sector to catch up by spreading improvement of living 
standards to the rural communities. This was important to balance economic growth 
among sectors, to slow the exodus to the cities, to solve a growing food supply problem, 
                                                 
7 Bank of Korea, Statistical Yearbook, 1977. 
8 Farm population declined from 15.5 million in 1964 to 14.4 million in 1970, and then to 12.8 million in 
1976. Ibid. 
9 This sketch of Korea’s economic growth is not meant to be comprehensive. Many other factors could be 
mentioned, including the major role played by centralized economic planning, encouragement of family-
based conglomerates (chaebol), inflows from foreign aid, and effective use of foreign financing. Two 
excellent studies in English are Kim, Eun Mee, Big Business, Strong State: Collusion and Conflict in South 
Korean Development, 1960–1990, State University of New York, 1997; Woo, Jung-en, Race to the Swift:  
State and Finance in Korean Industrialization, Columbia University Press, 1991. 
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and to respond to rising political opposition among the rural population whose support 
gained through land reform had begun to erode. 
 
 
Context for Korea’s Rural Transformation 
 
All development efforts take place in a particular social, economic and institutional 
context. In the case of Korea, SMU was implemented in a context where a number of 
factors were favorable to success, though success was by no means guaranteed.  
 
• Relatively egalitarian rural sector:  South Korea is one of the few countries in the 
post-World War II era to have experienced a comprehensive, radical and 
generally peaceful redistribution of wealth through a land-to-the-tiller land reform. 
The circumstances that allowed this revolutionary shift in a country where land 
was still the primary basis of wealth were extraordinary. The first step, in 1948, 
was distribution of lands confiscated from Japanese colonial landlords, carried out 
while South Korea was under United States military occupation. Land 
redistribution affecting the rest of the rural sector was implemented in 1951, after 
North Korea’s invasion and occupation of much of the South was repulsed. The 
socio-economic impact was profound, transforming rural Korea from a landlord-
dominated economy and social structure to a relatively egalitarian rural society 
characterized by small-farm owners and few landless households. One result was 
to bring political stability to the rural areas during the 1950s and 60s, allowing the 
government to turn its attention to promoting development of the industrial sector. 
• Socially integrated rural communities:  In addition to the economic leveling 
resulting from land reform, most Korean villages have long been characterized by 
tight social bonds based on the concept of common home place (gohyang) and 
frequently common family lineages (dongjok). Villages traditionally selected their 
own leaders, held meetings to settle problems, and organized mutual aid societies 
(gye) as well as cooperative work teams (dure, pumassi) for rice transplanting, 
harvesting and village projects.10 
• Declining farm population:  Migration from rural to urban areas accelerated in the 
1960s as President Park’s industrialization drive created new jobs, and a serious 
family planning program was implemented to slow the post-war population surge. 
                                                 
10 See my paper on this topic presented at the first international conference on the Saemaul Undong, in 
December 1980.  Edward P. Reed, “Village Cooperation and the Saemaul Movement:  Perspectives from a 
Case Study,” in Man-Gap Lee, ed., Toward a New Community Live: Reports for International Research 
Seminar on the Saemaul Movement, Institute of Saemaul Undong Studies, Seoul National University, 1981, 
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As a result, population pressure on rural land was decreasing by the start of the 
SMU, and by the middle of the decade rural labor scarcity was beginning to be a 
problem.  
• Strong agricultural support institutions:  During the 1950s and 60s, with 
substantial assistance from the U.S. and other donors, Korea built up an 
impressive and effective agricultural research and rural extension service. Also, a 
government-sponsored cooperative, Nonghyeop, was established with near- 
universal farmer membership that effectively provided credit, sold inputs, and 
purchased the bulk of agricultural production at prices established by the 
government. 
 
• Effective authoritarian governance: Korea has a long history of strong, 
centralized administration with direct and effective control over local government 
units. Under President Park this administrative system was streamlined and 
mobilized at every level for implementation of development policies. Though 
Park’s rule was increasingly authoritarian, public administration was largely 
effective, free of major corruption, with promotion based on performance. For 
implementing SMU, appointed civil servants at the county (gun) and sub-country 
(myeon) levels became the frontline agents of change.11 
 
• Near-universal literacy: In the 1950s and 60s, Korea made major investments in 
primary education, so that by 1970 the literacy rate, even among the rural adult 
population, was high. For this reason Korean farmers, especially the younger 
generation, were prepared to participate in development projects and accept 
technical innovations. 
 
 
Korea’s Rural Development Policy, 1960s and 1970s 
The Korean rural sector was relatively neglected during the 1960s when President Park’s 
focus was on accelerating industrialization making use of cheap labor and low food 
prices. Nevertheless, a number of important programs and investments were made in the 
agricultural sector during this decade, with the support of development assistance from 
the United States and other countries, creating favorable preconditions for rural 
development. Perhaps the most important early investment was the creation and 
expansion of the agricultural research and extension service based in Suwon. Also, there 
                                                 
11 See Larry L. Burmeister, “State, Industrialization and Agricultural Policy in Korea,” Development and 
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were investments in irrigation systems and marketing facilities. Nevertheless, rural 
incomes remained stagnant and young people continued to pour into the cities. 
In 1971, with industrial development forging ahead, President Park decided to direct 
major new attention to rural development.12 In the Third Five-Year Economic 
Development Plan (1972–76) investment in agriculture was greatly increased. Ongoing 
programs were accelerated and new programs introduced. During the 1970s major 
investments were made in expanding irrigation, consolidating rice paddies to allow for 
later mechanization, rapidly introducing new hybrid rice varieties, increasing use of 
fertilizer and other chemical inputs, rural electrification, and expanding transportation 
networks. Probably the most important policy change was to adjust the terms of trade to 
favor the agricultural sector by increasing the government purchase price of rice and 
protecting the agricultural sector from cheaper imports.  
The net effect of these policies was a steady increase in rural incomes through the 1970s 
to the point that farm household income more or less matched that of urban worker 
households.13 Studies at the time showed that the most important factors in increasing 
average rural incomes were (1) the favorable rice pricing policy; (2) increased rice yields 
using new hybrid seeds; and (3) smaller household size due to rapid out-migration from 
the rural sector.14 
The essential point is that Korea’s rural development success took place in the context of 
a rapidly expanding economy that created rapid job growth outside of agriculture and 
allowed large-scale government investments in the rural sector through pricing policy, 
new technology and infrastructure. So, what was the role of Saemaul Undong in this 
success story and what can other countries learn from Korea’s experience? 
 
The Role of Saemaul Undong 
When analyzing the Saemaul Undong experience there are two important clarifications to 
make. The first is the scope of the program. SMU began as a rather conventional 
integrated community development program with the aim of improving the physical 
environment of villages, introducing new attitudes and skills, and increasing incomes 
                                                 
12 There are clear indications that Park was at least partly motivated by growing dissatisfaction in the rural 
areas and urban slums, as reflected in his narrow victory over Kim Dae--jung in the election of 1970. A 
positive way to view this is that Park was responding to sentiment expressed through a democratic process.  
13 Park Soo-young, “Saemaul Undong, p. 62. By 1979, this trend stalled and the gap between rural and 
urban worker incomes again opened but remained at a modest level. 
14 See Mason, Edward S., et al. The Economic and Social Modernization of the Republic of Korea. Harvard 
College, 1980. This landmark work on Korea’s rapid development period was a major project of the 
Korean Development Institute and Harvard University. 
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through small-scale self-help projects introduced by government agents and implemented 
through village cooperation. However, seeing the early positive response by villagers, 
President Park realized that SMU could become the rallying cry for mobilizing not only 
the farmers but also the bureaucracy and the entire population to focus attention on the 
rural areas. In this way the definition of Saemaul Undong expanded beyond the 
community level program to encompass the entire spectrum of the government’s rural 
development policies and programs, including the income-increasing policy initiatives 
outlined above.  
If the definition of SMU is restricted to that of a village-level community development 
program promoting self-help, hard work and cooperation, we might conclude that its 
impact was limited. Village-level projects to change farmhouse roofs from thatch to 
galvanized iron, to straighten village lanes, clear irrigation canals, and start small-scale 
income generating projects taken alone could not account for the significant income 
increases that were achieved. Similar programs earlier in Korea and community 
development (CD) programs in other countries have had limited sustained impact.15 
However, if we define SMU as Korea’s entire program for accelerating agricultural and 
rural development in the 1970s then we can claim that SMU was a great success.  
A second point that needs emphasis is that SMU’s success was built on the ironic 
combination of cooperation at the village level with mobilization and direction from an 
authoritarian government. Given the political system of Korea at that time, no village 
could refuse to participate in the SMU program, even if the immediate benefits were not 
clear to them. On the other hand, the village-level process and its success was largely 
attributable to the cooperative ethos and patterns that characterized Korean village life. 
Not only was every level of government involved in promoting SMU, an entire parallel 
bureaucracy was created to ensure that plans made at the national level were 
communicated from the President down to the local level. This structure was also used to 
build a kind of personality cult around President Park. But at the village level the 
traditional forms of cooperation and the roughly egalitarian social structure ensured that 
these pressures were buffered and translated into collective action through traditional 
forms of community cooperation.16 
Therefore, Saemaul Undong was a national campaign that positively branded the 
government’s major program of rural modernization and development and mobilized 
every village, and nearly every villager, in Korea to participate. But this was not 
superficial political dressing. In fact, Saemaul Undong contributed additional and 
                                                 
15 Ghazala Mansuri and Vijayendra Rao, “Community-based and -driven Development: A Critical 
Review,” World Bank Research Observer, (2004) 19 (1): 1–39. To access the Working Paper:  
http://www.cultureandpublicaction.org/bijupdf/CDDFinalWorkingPaper.pdf.  
16 Vincent S.R. Brandt, “Value and Attitude Change and the Saemaul Movement,” in Man-Gap Lee, ed., 
Toward a New Community Life …, pp. 483–507. 
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probably essential ingredients that enabled Korea’s rural sector to advance so rapidly.17 
Among these ingredients: 
• Positive political and social environment:  President Park and his team made 
Saemaul Undong the flagship campaign for Korea in the 1970s. Through brilliant 
branding and marketing, the entire population—urban and rural—was rallied to 
the cause of rural development. Farmers joined the CEOs of export industries as 
heroes in the drive for national development. Greater prestige was awarded to 
farmers and rural communities, bringing them into the march to modernization. 
The age-old bias against agriculture as a respectable profession was, if not 
reversed, at least blunted. This was not only important for rallying the spirit of the 
farmers but also for justifying the investments in the rural areas that city-dwellers 
were financing. 
• New farmer-government relationship:  In Korea, as in most other traditional 
agricultural societies, rural communities and farmers found themselves at the 
bottom of a multi-layered administrative bureaucracy. Policies and targets (for 
harvests, taxes) were established at the top and passed down through the 
command chain until they reached the villages in the form of local officials, grain 
brokers and tax collectors. While Saemaul Undong did not break this chain, it 
created new incentives based on actual results at the village level against which 
local officials were evaluated. This encouraged more of a cooperative relationship 
between local officials and farming communities, and required officials to listen 
and respond to the needs of farmers if they were to achieve the goals set for them. 
• New village leadership:  Korean villages had always selected their own rijang 
(village chief) through informal processes, but tradition usually dictated that 
leadership go to an elder of the dominant clan—even after land reform. These 
traditional leaders were usually skilled in resolving disputes and negotiating with 
higher authorities. Saemaul Undong did not challenge these traditional leaders. 
Rather, it created a new cohort of younger and development-oriented leaders who 
served as change agents in the villages. The new leaders were identified by the 
county officials based on a set of educational and performance criteria, and then 
endorsed by the rijang and traditional leaders. The Saemaul leader was enrolled in 
a special program of ideological, practical and leadership training at the national 
Saemaul Leadership Training Center. He (almost always a male) then became the 
                                                 
17 SMU shares some common characteristics with other government-led mass mobilization campaigns, 
such as the Ujamaa Movement in Tanzania, the early Indian Community Development program, and the 
“Learn from Dazhai” campaign in China; some aspects even recall the late 1950s Chollima Movement in 
North Korea. But in the case of SMU restraint on the part of the national leadership, feedback loops from 
the villages, genuine benefits to the participants, and the context of an open market-based economic system 
limited excesses and led to positive results. 
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focal point for introducing all government development initiatives at the village 
level. 
• Enhanced economic role of women:  The Saemaul package included the creation 
(or strengthening) of Mother’s Clubs (Eomeoni-hoi) in every village. With the 
guidance and support of a special government unit, women were encouraged to 
initiate small-scale income generating projects, increase savings, reduce spending 
on traditional ceremonies, and more actively participate in village decision-
making. Endorsement by the President of the important role of women in village 
economic life was an important and lasting contribution of the SMU. 
• Development-oriented cooperation:  As noted earlier, long before Saemaul 
Undong was introduced, most Korean villages were characterized by a high 
degree of cooperation. SMU built on this cooperative tradition and directed it into 
development-oriented projects that built new village infrastructure, invested in 
micro-enterprises, facilitated introduction of new farming technologies, and 
increased savings rates through the Saemaul Geumgo or village bank. So, 
cooperation as a means of coping with rural life became cooperation for 
transforming rural life. 
In summary, most of the Korean government’s initiatives for improving agricultural 
productivity and increasing rural incomes could have been implemented without a 
Saemaul Undong. But would they have achieved the success and rapid impact that 
actually occurred in rural Korea? Probably not. Saemaul Undong wrapped the entire 
effort to transform the rural areas economically and socially in an ubiquitous national 
movement under the personal leadership of President Park. The all-encompassing 
movement put agriculture at the center of the drive for modernization (along with 
industrialization), mobilized the bureaucracy, raised the status of village life and farming 
as a profession, and enlisted the entire nation in the campaign. Without the massive 
investments in rural development, Saemaul Undong would have remained an interesting 
but not a transformative program; but without Saemaul Undong Korea’s investments in 
agriculture would not have yielded the spectacular results that were actually achieved. 
 
Lessons for Today’s Developing Countries 
Saemaul Undong cannot be considered a model for other countries, if by model we mean 
a package that can be transferred more or less intact to a different context with the 
expectation of similar results. Nevertheless, other countries can learn important lessons 
from the early Saemaul Undong experience.  
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There are two important points to consider in applying lessons from SMU:  the local 
context and the level of program intervention.  
Although many of today’s developing countries share some of the characteristics of 
Korea in the 1960s and 70s, most reflect a very different rural, national and international 
environment. There are few that have the advantages that Korea enjoyed at the launch of 
the Saemaul Undong. Many rural areas are characterized by concentrated land ownership 
and high rates of tenancy, creating wide disparities in income and concentration of 
political power, frequently linked to influence at the national level. Weak governance is 
often a problem at both national and local levels. The population of many poor countries 
continues to grow, creating pressures on land, water and other resources, and creating a 
large and growing population of landless workers. Few developing countries have the 
financial and technical resources to pump investment into the agricultural sector in 
support of a community development program. And in many countries there are already 
rural development programs of one kind or another that might be strengthened rather than 
introducing an entirely new program. So the first step is to study and understand the local 
economic, social and political context, and support local efforts to address the most 
pressing constraints to improving living standards. 
Saemaul Undong flew with two wings. One wing was a comprehensive, nationwide 
agricultural and rural development program aggressively pushed by a powerful 
government and backed by major resources. The other wing was mobilization of 
cooperation at the village level to enable farmers to participate in and benefit from the 
program. In countries where the government is prepared to embrace this comprehensive 
approach, linking national programs with local mobilization, results similar to those 
achieved in Korea might be expected. However, introducing only the village-level 
aspects of the SMU in selected locations may yield some short-term local improvements, 
but without the links to national supporting programs and investments, the level of 
change seen in Korea would be unlikely. 
Nevertheless, there are some clear lessons that emerge from Korea’s extraordinary rural 
transformation and the Saemaul Undong. I would offer a few general principles for 
consideration based on Korea’s experience: 
• Create the foundations for rural development: 
o Invest early and consistently in rural education and health programs that 
help create the human capital that will be capable of taking advantage of 
new economic opportunities. 
o Strengthen the capacity of local governance institutions to plan and 
administer national policies and programs at the local level. 
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o Invest in agricultural research capacity and extension services that test and 
introduce appropriate technologies and cropping systems for increased 
productivity and more market-responsive agriculture. 
o Create institutions and infrastructure to support the rural economy, 
including finance, processing, storage, transport, communication, etc. 
• Cultivate strong leadership skills: 
o Encourage and support strong national-level leadership with a 
commitment to sustained improvements in the rural sector. Not every 
country can expect a Park Chung Hee to emerge, but champions within the 
government can be identified and supported. 
o Create a program to identify and train a cohort of village-level change 
agents and support them with continuing education and resources linked to 
the extension service. 
o Organize study trips for national and village-level leaders together to 
travel to other regions or other countries to observe best practices in rural 
and community development. 
o Support the empowerment of rural women to play leadership roles in the 
local economy. 
• Enact national policies that favor the rural sector: 
o Integrate rural development as a high priority into the national economic 
development plan. 
o Implement farm input marketing and product procurement through pricing 
mechanisms that create incentives for production and support rising farm 
incomes. 
o Promote decentralized industrial development to expand non-farm 
employment opportunities in rural areas. 
• Add the special ingredient, the Saemaul Spirit: 
o Inaugurate and sustain a national campaign that places farmers at the 
center of the drive for national strength and development. Cultivate the 
universal belief that “farmers are the foundation of the nation.” 
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o Actively engage villagers in planning and implementing community 
projects by starting with their priorities and supporting them with needed 
resources. 
o Reward rural communities that are successful with more resources and 
investment; raise them up as models for the country. 
o Reward local officials and bureaucrats based on the evaluation by villages 
in their jurisdiction.  
 
Conclusion 
Saemaul Undong has become a national brand in Korea’s program for sharing its own 
development experience with other countries. Governments and local leaders from 
countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America have expressed interest in learning how 
Korea’s countryside was transformed so rapidly in the early period of Korea’s 
development. The Saemaul Undong Center has responded with well organized training 
programs that tell the story of SMU and encourage leaders to initiate similar programs in 
their own countries, frequently using the same symbols, songs and slogans of the original 
SMU. In some cases the Center has provided technical assistance and start-up capital to 
help village programs get off the ground. These programs are obviously playing an 
important role. 
However, the Saemaul Undong should not be taught as a transplant-ready model to be 
replicated in other countries. Rather, Korea’s comprehensive rural development 
experience, including the role of Saemaul Undong, should be shared and studied. Based 
on an understanding of Korea’s historical context and development approach, leaders 
from today’s developing countries can draw general lessons and principles that they 
assess as relevant to their own situations. Rural development programs are not new in 
most developing countries. Other countries are not starting from a clean slate. It is 
important to understand and, where possible, build on indigenous efforts. 
There is much that developing countries can learn by studying Korea’s rural development 
experience. Perhaps the most important lesson is the importance of the larger context 
within which the SMU was implemented. Other countries and communities have 
different histories and face different constraints, and leaders must adapt the SMU 
approach to their own situations. Another lesson is that sustainable, widespread 
improvements depend on leadership, action and investments at both the national level and 
the community level. In countries with committed national leadership, Korea can provide 
assistance in planning nationwide programs for accelerating rural development, in 
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coordination with KOICA and other ODA programs. The Saemaul Undong Center can 
support the creation or strengthening of national rural development training centers, 
similar to the Saemaul Leadership Training Center created by President Park.  
In countries with weak governance a bottom-up approach may be more appropriate. In 
this case Korea can identify, train and support civil society leaders who are passionate 
about improving rural communities in their country and who can inspire a growing 
movement. The SMU Center has already trained hundreds of such potential leaders. 
Initial results may be limited to a few target communities and sustainability may be a 
challenge. Programs are needed to provide follow-up support to assist these leaders in 
creating self-reliant national movements that can apply the lessons of Korea’s experience 
to nationwide rural development.  
Sharing the Saemaul experience, like all development cooperation, should be a mutual 
learning experience. Korean leaders have the Saemaul experience and spirit as well as 
resources and are ready to share these. Armed with deep knowledge of the history and 
context of other countries, they can offer effective support. Leaders in developing 
countries have their own experience, as well as commitment, local knowledge and the 
courage to innovate in difficult circumstances. They can study Korea’s experience and 
adapt it to their own situation. In this way, both Koreans and their partners in developing 
countries continue a mutual learning process, inspired by the success of Saemaul Undong. 
 
  
